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THE DEMISE OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT?: A PREVIEW OF
NORTHWEST AUSTIN MUNICIPAL
DISTRICT NUMBER ONE v. HOLDER
CHRISTOPHER F. MORIARTY*

I. INTRODUCTION
The landscape in American voting has changed dramatically in the
years since the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, culminating in the
election of the nation’s first African-American President last year.
Despite these advances, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) and
its subsequent reauthorizations and amendments impose strict
requirements on how elections may be carried out in parts of the
country with a history of racial discrimination in voting.1 In particular,
Section 5 of the VRA prohibits jurisdictions covered by the Act from
making any changes in their election laws without approval from the
Justice Department or the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.2 A change can be pre-cleared only if one of
these entities determines that it “neither has the purpose nor will
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color.”3 Simultaneously, in order to address the potential
problems of overinclusiveness that could result from Section 5’s
coverage, Section 4(a) of the VRA allows the covered jurisdictions to
bail-out from these requirements if they meet certain conditions.4

* 2009 LL.M. candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-l (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)).
2. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (outlining the procedure for changes in the election
process in covered jurisdictions).
3. Id.
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (allowing jurisdictions to earn exemption from coverage by
satisfying a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
that, in the previous ten years, they have not used a test or device “for the purpose or with the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color”).
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Congress has reauthorized and amended the VRA several times
following its original enactment in 1965—most recently in 2006, when
it was extended for another twenty-five years.5 A mere eight days
after its 2006 renewal, however, Sections 4(a) and 5 were challenged
by the Petitioner, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One (“the District”).6 On May 30, 2008, a three-judge panel
of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
rejected both the Petitioner’s request to bail-out from Section 5
coverage and its challenge to the constitutionality of Sections 4(a) and
7
5.
II. FACTS
The District is a local government entity created in the late-1980s
to facilitate the development of a residential subdivision.8 It is wholly
9
within the boundaries of both Travis County and the City of Austin,
10
but is not subject to the control of either. The District, however, has
contracted with Travis County to administer its elections.11 After the
2006 reauthorization of the VRA continued election coverage over
the District, the District filed suit arguing both that it had a statutory
right to bail-out from Section 5 coverage and, alternatively, that
12
Section 5 is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power. This
second, broader challenge is based on the District’s assertion that
when Congress extended Section 5’s coverage provisions in 2006, it
lacked sufficient evidence of racial discrimination to justify the
continued voting restrictions in jurisdictions where it had been a
problem but may no longer be one.13

5. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-l.
6. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey (Northwest Austin), 573 F. Supp. 2d
221 (D.D.C. 2008), argued sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, No. 08-322
(U.S., Apr. 19, 2009), 2009 WL 1146055 (the case’s name was changed due to Attorney General
Holder replacing Attorney General Mukasey as U.S. Attorney General).
7. Id. at 223–24.
8. Id. at 229–30.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.; Brief for Appellee Travis County at 6, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, No. 08-322 (U.S., Mar. 18, 2009), 2009 WL 740766.
13. Northwest Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Congress originally provided in Section 4(b) that the requirements
of Sections 4(a) and 5 would apply to any state or political subdivision
that both: (1) according to the Attorney-General, maintained a test or
device [for voting registration] on November 1, 1964; and (2)
according to the Director of the Census, had registration or turnout
14
rates below 50% of the voting age population on November 1, 1964.
15
Originally, Section 4(b) did not cover the State of Texas. The 1975
amendments to the VRA, however, expanded the definition of “test
or device” to include jurisdictions that provided voting materials only
in English and where more than 5% of voting-age citizens belonged
16
to a single language minority. Consequently, the statute covered
Texas.17
The District’s challenge is not the first challenge to the VRA.
Shortly after it was originally passed, South Carolina—which the
VRA provisions covered in its entirety—challenged the
18
constitutionality of the preclearance requirement. The United States
Supreme Court rejected South Carolina’s arguments, holding that
Congress had properly exercised its enforcement powers under the
Fifteenth Amendment because Congress may use “any rational means
to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting.”19
Congress subsequently reauthorized Sections 4 and 5 several
20
times over the past few decades. Each subsequent reauthorization
has likewise been challenged; each time unsuccessfully.21 Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder represents the

14. 1965 Act § 4(b), 79 Stat. at 438 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)).
15. See generally id. (limiting the geographic jurisdiction of the Voting Rights Act).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(f)(3) (expanding the Voting Rights Act’s reach to jurisdictions
that only provided voting materials in English and that had significant numbers of non-Englishspeaking citizens).
17. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973d, 1973k (expanding coverage to incorporate jurisdictions
including Texas).
18. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966).
19. Id. at 324, 327.
20. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey (Northwest Austin), 573 F. Supp.
2d 221, 226–27 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing the reauthorizations of the Voting Rights Act).
21. See Brief for the Federal Appellee at 15, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, No. 08-322 (U.S., Mar. 18, 2009), 2009 WL 819480 (“Beginning in South Carolina [v.
Katzenbach], this Court has upheld the constitutionality of the VRA on four separate
occasions.”).

DO NOT DELETE

5/11/2009 1:49:04 PM

462 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:459

latest challenge to Congress’s enforcement of the VRA under its
Reconstruction Amendments powers.
IV. HOLDING
The district court rejected the District’s claims on two grounds.
First, the court held that the District was ineligible to seek a
declaratory judgment exempting it from Section 5 because it did not
22
qualify as a “political subdivision” as defined in the VRA. Second,
the court, applying the rational basis standard set forth in South
23
Carolina v. Katzenbach —that government action need only
represent a reasonable means of pursuing a legitimate governmental
interest—found that Congress’s decision to extend Section 5 for an
additional twenty-five years was rational. Section 5 was therefore held
to be constitutional, given the extensive legislative record
documenting continued racial discrimination in covered districts.24 The
district court also concluded in the alternative that, even if the
extension of Section 5 was controlled by the stricter standard laid
down in City of Boerne v. Flores25—that the government must show
that the remedial legislation is sufficiently connected to remedying a
constitutional violation—Section 5 passed muster. Section 5’s tailored
and remedial scheme meant that the extension qualified as a
“congruent and proportional” response to the continued problem of
racial discrimination in voting in the covered districts.26
V. ANALYSIS
A. Is the Municipality Eligible for Bail-out As a “Political
Subdivision”?
The District argues that it satisfies the requirements for bail-out
under the plain meaning of Section 4(a), which states that “any
political subdivision of” any covered State may seek a bail-out

22. Northwest Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
23. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966) (holding that the
Voting Rights Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the enforcement clause of the
Fifteenth Amendment).
24. Northwest Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 223–24.
25. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (holding that the Religious
Freedom and Restoration Act was not a congruent and proportional response to the protection
of substantive rights).
26. Northwest Austin, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 223–24.
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declaration.27 Because the District is considered a political subdivision
under Texas law, it should likewise qualify as a political subdivision
under the VRA.28 Given that the Court should “give the words of a
statute their ‘ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ absent an
29
indication Congress intended them to bear some different import[,]”
and that Congress has expressed no contrary meaning, the District
30
contends that it should be covered by the bail-out procedure. The
Federal Government, however, argues that the District is seeking an
expansion of the bail-out provision “that the statutory text will not
bear” and that the district court was correct in rejecting the District’s
interpretation of the statute.31
Originally, only two categories of jurisdictions were eligible to
seek bail-out under Section 4(a): (1) designated States and (2)
“political subdivision[s]” separately designated for coverage even if
the state was not.32 The District acknowledges that, under these
33
original bail-out criteria, it does not qualify for bail-out. But the
District contends that the 1982 Amendments to the VRA govern the
current situation because Congress added a third type of jurisdiction
eligible for bail-out: “any political subdivision of [a covered] State . . .
though such determinations were not made with respect to such
subdivisions as a separate unit.”34 The Federal Government responds
that the District cannot rely on this provision, as it was designed only
35
to apply to subdivisions defined in Section 14(c)(2). As the District
does not conduct voter registration itself, the district court found, and
the Federal Government urges the Court to affirm, that the District
cannot fall into this third category.36
Finally, the practical effect of interpreting the statute against the
District makes it effectively impossible for it ever to secure bail-out:

27. Id. at 230; 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1).
28. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 59(a), (b) (holding that the District would qualify as a
“political subdivision”).
29. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000).
30. Brief for the Appellant at 17, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, No. 08322 (U.S., Feb. 19, 2009), 2009 WL 453246.
31. Brief for the Federal Appellee, supra note 21, at 7.
32. VRA § 4(a), 79 Stat. 438 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(a)(1) (Supp. I 1965)).
33. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, No. 08-322
(U.S., Dec. 9, 2008), 2008 WL 5195625.
34. VRA § 2(b)(2), 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)).
35. VRA § 14(c)(2) defines “political subdivision” as “any county or parish” that “conducts
registration for voting” when the county does not (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2)).
36. Brief for Federal Appellee, supra note 21, at 10.
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“In most covered States, including Texas, restricting [bail-out] to the
county level makes the bailout procedure practically unworkable. For
example, the territory of Travis County, in which the district is located,
37
includes at least 107 geographically smaller government units.”
B. What Standard of Review Should Apply If the District Is Eligible
to Bail-Out?
The issue that will have more far-reaching implications is whether
Section 5’s restrictions pass constitutional muster under Congress’s
power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments.38 The Supreme
Court has articulated two distinct standards for evaluating the
constitutionality of laws enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments
depending on which amendment is implicated: (1) a “congruence and
proportionality” test for legislation enacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) a less demanding rational basis test
for effectuating the prohibition of racial discrimination in voting
under the Fifteenth Amendment.39 The first issue, then, is what
standard the VRA should be judged under: the rational basis
standard, as set forth in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, or the
congruence and proportionality test, as laid out in City of Boerne v.
Flores.
The District contends that the “original emergency [that prompted
40
the restrictions] has now passed,” and that it can demonstrate a
continued history of respect for voting rights and therefore present a
compelling case that the burdens imposed upon it should be
removed.41 The District argues that the Court’s 1997 decision in City
of Boerne, which held that Congress’s remedial powers under the
Reconstruction Amendments must pass a congruence and
proportionality test, makes its challenge ripe for success.42
Moreover, the District questions Congress’s reliance on decadesold data in renewing Section 5 in 2006 in order to show the
reauthorization did not represent a congruent and proportional
37. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 30, at 24.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; id. amend. XV.
39. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey (Northwest Austin), 573 F. Supp.
2d 221, 235–36 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) & South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966)) (discussing Congress’s ability to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments).
40. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 30, at 2.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 32–33.
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exercise of Congress’s enforcement powers under the Reconstruction
Amendments.43 The District argues that “[a] workable [bail-out]
process is the only possible way of removing compliant jurisdictions
44
from § 5’s overbroad coverage.” It must be questioned whether
Section 5 is a valid exercise of the enforcement power, given that “[i]f
bailout is indeed unavailable to jurisdictions like the [D]istrict, it is of
no practical use for correcting Congress’s reliance on obsolete data
and restraining § 5’s reach.”45
Moreover, the District argues that:
[p]rophylactic legislation enacted to enforce the substantive
guarantees of the Reconstruction Amendments must be clearly
related to remedying violations of those guarantees. And the more
a prophylactic measure intrudes on the scope of other
constitutional provisions and principles, the more critical it is that
the measure fit as closely as possible to a valid remedial
46
objective.

This lack of congruence and proportionality, given the absence of
discrimination in Travis County over the past decade, is favorable to
the District. It can point to the fact that the conditions that justified
Section 5 in 1965 are not the same as those in 2006, so Congress’s
actions do not meet the City of Boerne standard. Section 5 coverage
cannot be justified as being a congruent and proportional response to
discrimination where such discrimination does not exist. Furthermore,
the original enactment of Section 5 was initially “confined to those
regions of the country where voting discrimination had been most
flagrant,”47 but the District’s electoral landscape in 2006 was very
different from the original conditions that prompted the VRA, thus
48
giving weight to the argument that continued coverage is excessive.
The District elaborates on the now antiquated nature of the
continued preclearance requirements: “Section 5 today imposes a
scarlet letter on residents of covered jurisdictions based on acts of
their grandparents or—given our mobile society—other people’s
grandparents.”49 Furthermore, the District asserts that § 5 “cannot be

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 30.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532–33 (1997).
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 30, at 57.
Id. at 58.
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justified simply on a record of discrimination in general. Instead, there
must be a showing . . . of a systematic pattern of covered jurisdictions
recently engaging in concerted efforts to game the system to the
disadvantage of minorities by acting preemptively to impose new
barriers to voting.”50
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder
also raises federalism concerns. Section 5 goes beyond addressing
discrimination and preempts all changes to voting procedures in
covered jurisdictions, risking the balance of state and federal power,
and representing “the most severe intrusion on state sovereignty in
51
federal law.” Put simply, when Congress extended the VRA in 2006,
did it have sufficient evidence of racial discrimination in voting to
justify its intrusion upon state sovereignty? For Congress to justify
such an intrusion, there must be “a clear demonstration that it
remains a needed and justifiable emergency remedy, separate and
distinct from the general justification for the VRA’s core substantive
provisions.”52
The Federal Government rebuts the District’s argument simply by
stating that even if Section 5 is judged under the congruent and
proportional standard set forth in City of Boerne—and not the more
deferential rational basis test—it still fails: “Even when applying the
congruence-and-proportionality standard, the Court has never
invalidated a statute securing rights that the Court’s decisions
53
recognize as entitled to heightened protection.” Protection of the
rights of racial minorities to vote is at the very top of this heightened
protection. While the Court is traditionally deferential to
Congressional findings, it will be interesting to see just how
deferential the Roberts Court will be to findings that do not directly
implicate the District in racial discrimination in voting.
VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION
Ultimately, there remains a possibility that the Supreme Court will
reach an anti-climatic decision and not even address the bigger

50. Id. at 40.
51. Id. at 42.
52. Id.
53. Brief for the Federal Appellee, supra note 21, at 25 (citing Nevada Dep’t of Human
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003)) (recognizing that the Court has upheld the family leave
provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 under the congruence-andproportionality standard).
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question concerning the constitutionality of Section 5. If the Court
accepts the first part of the District’s claim—that it is a “political
subdivision” that is eligible to bail-out—then the constitutional
question may become moot as the case would be resolved by
permitting the District to bail-out.
A. Strengths and Weaknesses of the District’s Case
“In upholding the original § 5 as a provision with a five-year
lifespan, South Carolina v. Katzenbach characterized it as a response
to an acute emergency.”54 Consequently, the District argues that
“Congress cannot indefinitely continue exercising extraordinary
powers in response to an emergency with no showing the emergency
persists.”55 This consideration is likely to carry considerable weight if
the Respondents cannot convince the Court that the evidence of
continued racial discrimination in voting is compelling enough that
only Section 5’s broad approach will suffice. The considerable
weakness in the District’s case, however, is that considerable
Congressional findings were presented when the VRA was
reauthorized in 2006 (discussed below).
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Respondents’ Case
Congress is afforded a great deal of latitude when enforcing the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments: “This Court . . . has
repeatedly reaffirmed that Congress is ‘entitled to much deference’ in
‘determin[ing] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the
guarantees’ of the Reconstruction Amendments.”56 As such, the
Respondents appear to be in a strong position to ask the Court to
defer to Congress in this area, especially given that “deference to
Congress is highest when it enforces the core protections of the
57
Reconstruction Amendments.” Congress has repeatedly attempted
to remedy racial discrimination in voting; the fact that it did so as
recently as 2006 weighs in favor of Respondents’ argument that there
remains a continued need for federal preclearance requirements.
Moreover, given that racial discrimination in voting has been reduced
considerably since the passage of the VRA, the Court might be
54. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 30, at 61.
55. Id. at 61–62.
56. Brief for Federal Appellee, supra note 21, at 18 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 536 (1997)).
57. Id. at 19.
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inclined to see the VRA as a powerful force that does more good than
it does harm, and should therefore be left in place.
At the same time, the Court’s congruence and proportionality test
in City of Boerne v. Flores leaves the Respondents open to attack on
grounds that there no longer remains a continuing need for Section 5
in light of the progress made in eliminating racial discrimination in
voting. If the Court sees the case as primarily being under the
Fifteenth Amendment (as the district court did), then it should be
relatively easy for the Respondents to satisfy the lower standard of
the “any rational means” test. Alternatively, if the Court is more
inclined to see it as a Fourteenth Amendment case, the Respondents
will face a more difficult task in showing that the VRA is congruent
and proportional in light of the lack of evidence of racial
discrimination in elections in the District.
Finally, Travis County claims that the District experiences only
“trivial” burdens from Section 5’s coverage, pointing to the fact that in
the two decades of the District’s existence it has only conducted one
58
contested election. Given the limited experience of the District in
conducting elections, the District could be found to be “institutionally
59
inexperienced with the benefits that [Section] 5 coverage brings.”
Establishing that Section 5 actually imposes a burden on the District
could therefore weaken the District’s argument. It will likely have to
satisfy the Court that, in contrast to Travis County’s assertion, there is
a practical reason to extend the bail-out option to it if the Court
decides that Section 5 is not an unconstitutional use of Congress’s
remedial powers under the Reconstruction Amendments.
Unlike the District, Travis County asserts that “racial
discrimination in voting is not a thing of bygone days and
60
generations[,]” which receives support from the Congressional
findings for the 2006 reauthorization.61 This may not be a guaranteed
victory for the Respondents, however, given that no discrimination
was found in the District itself. Although Travis County mentions the
continued prevalence of racial discrimination, it does not provide any
evidence of racial discrimination in voting occurring either within the
District or Travis County. Instead, Respondent Travis County relies on
58. Brief for Appellee Travis County, supra note 12, at 8.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 9.
61. See Brief for Federal Appellee, supra note 21, at 41 (discussing Congressional findings
in reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act).

DO NOT DELETE

5/11/2009 1:49:04 PM

2009] NORTHWESTER AUSTIN MUNICIPAL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE V. HOLDER

469

simplistic generalizations, such as: “There remain solid reasons to
keep . . . [Section] 5 on the statute books.”62 The Court is likely to
demand more in the way of firm evidence than these generalizations,
especially if it employs the congruence and proportionality test.
VII. CONCLUSION
Given the relatively new composition of the Roberts Court, the
decision in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v.
Holder is eagerly awaited, not just by those who oppose Section 5’s
continued application but also by those who believe Section 5 is
essential to the continued protection of minorities. This case will also
serve as an indicator of how the Court will treat future Congressional
legislation under the Reconstruction Amendments, and how far the
Court will allow federal intrusion in state affairs.

62. Brief for Appellee Travis County, supra note 12, at 17.

